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Abstract
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two inde-
pendent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk
for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence,
three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the er-
godic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe an intermittent behavior in the logarithmic
returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes
can be seen.
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INTRODUCTION
The continuous double auction is the trading system used by regulated equity markets.
The auction is called double as demand and offer are collected in a book where orders to
buy and to sell are registered, and continuous because orders can be placed at any instant
in a given daily time window. The detailed rules for trading may be different from one stock
exchange to the other, but, essentially, things work as follows. Traders can either place buy
orders (bids) or sell orders (asks) which are then registered in a book for a particular stock
traded in the exchange. The limit order is the typical one. A bid limit order is specified
by two numbers: the quantity q
(T )
b that trader T wants to buy and the upper limit price
p
(T )
b she is willing to pay for a single share. An ask limit order is an order to sell q
(T )
a
units of the share at a price not smaller than a limit price p
(T )
a selected by trader T . The
couples (p
(T )
b , q
(T )
b ) and (p
(T )
a , q
(T )
a ) are written in the book and ordered from the best bid
to the worst bid and from the best ask to the worst ask, respectively. The best bid is the
price pb = maxT∈Ib(p
(T )
b ), where Ib is the set of traders placing bids, whereas the best ask
is the price pa = minT∈Ia(p
(T )
a ), where Ia is the set of traders placing asks. At every time
t, one has that pa(t) > pb(t). Occasionally, a market order may take place, when a trader
accepts a best bid or best ask price from the book, and the i-th trade occurs at the epoch
ti. Stock exchanges specify rules for the priorities of limit orders placed at the same price
and for execution of market orders with quantities that are not totally available at the
actual best price. The sequence of prices p(ti) at which trades take place at epochs ti is an
important process for understanding market dynamics. As detailed below, one can describe
this sequence in terms of a suitable continuous-time random walk.
MODEL
In our model, following [1], prices assume N integer values from 1 to N . A price can be
regarded as a class where orders are placed. This way of representing prices is a faithful
representation of what happens in real markets due to price discretization. The only un-
realistic feature is the presence of an upper limit to prices which we keep to ensure partial
analytical tractability. Note that orders can be considered as objects to be classified by
prices at which they are placed (see [2] for a general discussion on the problem of allocating
2
objects to classes). We only consider two kinds of orders, namely, limit orders and market
orders. As discussed above, limit orders can be of two types: limit bid orders, i.e. orders to
FIG. 1: A state of the system. Limit bid orders are depicted by circles whereas squares
represent limit ask. Each order can be described by a label. An individual description is a
list showing, for each limit order, whether it is a bid or an ask and to which category
(price) it belongs. Here, it is x1 = (8, a), x2 = (9, a), x3 = (5, b), x4 = (8, a), x5 =
(4, b), x6 = (5, b), x7 = (5, b), x8 = (3, b), x9 = (7, a). A statistical description is a list
giving us for each category (price) the number of limit orders either of bid or of ask type it
contains. In this case it is ya1 = . . . = y
a
6 = 0, y
a
7 = 1, y
a
8 = 2, y
a
9 = 1, y
a
10 = 0 for ask
orders and yb1 = y
b
2 = 0, y
b
3 = 1, y
b
4 = 1, y
b
5 = 3, y
b
6 = . . . = y
b
10 = 0 for bid orders. Finally,
a partition description is the number of categories (prices) with zero limit ask or limit bid
orders, one ask/bid limit order, etc.. In this case we have za0 = 7, z
a
1 = 2, z
a
2 = 1 for ask
orders and zb0 = 7, z
b
1 = 2, z
b
2 = 0, z
b
3 = 1 for bid orders.
buy one share and limit ask orders, i.e. orders to sell one share. Market orders are also of
two types as either the best limit bid order or the best limit ask order are accepted when
a transaction occurs. When a market order arrives, only one limit order will be removed
either from the best bid category or the best ask category, provided that these categories
contain at least one order. In other words, we assume that all the orders are characterized by
quantities equal to one share. We shall further assume that limit ask orders arrive following
a Poisson process with rate λa and that limit bid orders arrive at a rate λb. These orders
are written in the book and they wait until a market order arrives. Remember that the best
limit bid orders, namely the limit bid orders offered at the highest price are always strictly
smaller than the best limit ask orders, that is the limit ask orders offered at the lowest price.
Market orders to buy, accepting one of the best ask orders, arrive in the market separated
by exponentially distributed waiting times with parameter µb, whereas market orders to sell
arrive with an exponential distribution of waiting times with parameter µa. If the book is
empty, or if the appropriate side of the book is empty, market orders are not executed. It is
3
necessary to remark that order inter-arrival times are not exponentially distributed in real
markets [3] due to the non-stationary behavior of humans [4]. However, to ensure analytical
tractability, here we assume that inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. We shall
assume that limit ask orders are uniformly placed in the price classes from pb + 1 to pb + n,
where pb is the class of the current best bids. Conversely, limit bid orders are uniformly
placed in the price classes from pa − n to pa − 1, where pa is the class of the current best
asks. As mentioned above, the accessible system states are limited by the condition pb < pa.
When pa is between 1 and n (pb between N − n + 1 and N), the bid (respectively, ask)
interval is restricted correspondingly. For instance, if pa = 1, no bids are possible. Finally, if
no orders are present in the book, the next bid, b, will be uniformly chosen in p−n ≤ b ≤ p
and the next ask, a in p ≤ a ≤ p+n, where p is the price of the last trade. The specification
of an initial price (which can be interpreted as the opening auction price) is then sufficient
to start the auction. Note that the model outlined above is essentially the same as in [5].
In terms of agent-based models, it is a zero intelligence agent-based model [6]. However, our
version does not suffer from using odd mathematical objects such as uniform distributions
over semi-infinite intervals. A preliminary discussion of our model was presented in [7].
The trade price process P (t) is a continuous-time random walk that we wish to char-
acterize. Let Ti denote the epoch of the i-th trade; in particular, we are interested in the
behaviour of the following random variable
Ri = log(P (Ti+1)/P (Ti)), (1)
called the tick-by-tick logarithmic return. This is the usual variable used in statistical finance
and financial econometrics for the analysis of tick-by-tick data [8]. It turns out that the
behaviour of Ri crucially depends on the presence or absence of statistical equilibrium in
the supply mechanism.
MAIN RESULTS
Indeed, there are two main regimes in this model and they are triggered by an ergodic
transition. Let us denote by A(t) the total number of limit ask orders and by B(t) the
total number of limit bid orders present in the book. By definition, these two random
processes are independent and they are M/M/1 queues with rates λa and µb and λb and
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µa, respectively [9]. M/M/1 queues are the continuous-time equivalent of birth and death
Markov chains. The conditions for the existence of statistical equilibrium (ergodicity) are
given by the following inequalities
λa < µb, (2)
and
λb < µa. (3)
The intuitive meaning of these conditions is as follows. If the rate of arrival for limit orders
is larger than the rate of market orders, then the number of orders in the book eventually
explodes. However, in this case, prices will be able to fluctuate only among a few values.
When the rate of market orders is larger than the rate of limit orders, the number of orders
in the book remains finite and prices are free to fluctuate over the whole available range. In
the ergodic regime, the invariant (and equilibrium) distributions of A(t) and B(t) are given
by two geometric distributions
P(A = a) =
(
λa
µb
)a(
1−
λa
µb
)
, (4)
and
P(B = b) =
(
λb
µa
)b(
1−
λb
µa
)
. (5)
Given the independence between A(t) and B(t), the joint probability density is
P(A = a, B = b) =
(
λa
µb
)a(
1−
λa
µb
)(
λb
µa
)b(
1−
λb
µa
)
, (6)
from which one can find the probability of finding an empty book
P(A = 0, B = 0) =
(
1−
λa
µb
)(
1−
λb
µa
)
. (7)
For our further analysis, we shall focus on the case of a symmetric auction, assuming
λa = λb = λ and µa = µb = µ and we shall consider the ratio ρ = λ/µ as the basic order
parameter of the model. In fact, there is no reason for a random auction to be unbalanced
towards selling or buying. As discussed above, if ρ < 1, we are in the ergodic regime,
whereas for ρ ≥ 1, we are in a regime where the orders accumulate and A(t), B(t)→∞, for
t → ∞. The two regimes give rise to two radically different behaviours for the tick-by-tick
log-returns (1). This is qualitatively shown in Fig. 2, where we report the behavior of prices
and log-returns in a Monte Carlo simulation for ρ = 0.8 (Fig. 2 a), ρ = 1.2 (Fig. 2 b)
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and for ρ = 6 (Fig. 2 c). One can see by eye that, in the ergodic regime, high and low
log-returns are clustered, whereas, in the non-ergodic one, such a volatility clustering does
not occur. Fig. 2 a clarifies the origin of clustering. When the price is lower, log-returns
are higher and the price process has the persistence behavior typical of random walks which
immediately leads to clusters of low and high volatility as the price slowly moves up and
down, respectively. The comparison between Fig. 2 b and Fig. 2 c shows that there are two
sub-regimes in the non-ergodic case. If 1 ≤ ρ < n, even if A(t) and B(t) diverge, the limit
orders belonging to the best bid and the best ask can be removed by market orders and prices
can fluctuate among a set, whereas if ρ ≥ n, then after a transient, the number of limit orders
belonging to the best bid and the best ask diverges and prices can only fluctuate between
two values. In this condition, the price process becomes a random telegraph process. This
behavior is justified by the fact that the process of the number of orders at the best bid price
(respectively, best ask) can be coupled with the state of an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate
λb/n (λa/n) and service rate µa (µb); this is so because limit orders, upon arrival, distribute
uniformly over the n best prices. If λb/(µan) = ρ/n ≥ 1, then the number of orders at the
best bid price converges to infinity, as t → ∞, meaning that all trades will occur at the
price where the bids accumulate. If λb/(µan) = ρ/n < 1, then the queue of the best bids
eventually empties with probability one, meaning that there is a positive probability that
the trading price changes. However, if we are in the region 1
n
≤
λb
µan
= ρ
n
< 1, then we
know that A(t), B(t)→∞, as t→∞. This means that the queue of the bids at some price
will eventually never empty, which means that trades at lower prices will never occur. By
symmetry, the same argument holds for asks.
The transition between regimes can be detected studying the moments of log-returns. In
table I, we give the descriptive statistics for log-returns, including mean, standard deviation,
skewness and kurtosis as well as the autocorrelation coefficient at the first lag of absolute
log-returns, c1, for different values of the parameter ρ. These statistics are computed on
1000 simulation runs with 106 events. Figure 3 shows standard deviation, kurtosis and
c1 in more detail, namely mean values and error bars are given for these three quantities
estimated from 1000 runs. One can see that these quantities increase in the non-ergodic case.
Our findings can be compared with those presented in a recent study of financial stylized
facts [10], where the authors find that higher rate of limit orders stabilizes the market by
decreasing the standard deviation of returns. In Fig. 4, we plot the sample autocorrelation
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FIG. 2: Time series of prices and log-returns in a system of N = 500 prices, length of
interval for placing orders n = 5, with initial price p0 = 250 and number of simulated
events t = 105. (a) ergodic case (ρ = 0.8); (b) non-ergodic case for 1 ≤ ρ < n (ρ = 1.2) and
(c) non-ergodic case for ρ ≥ n (ρ = 6).
ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 1 ρ = 1.2 ρ = 6
mean −3.298 · 10−6 −7.472 · 10−7 −2.068 · 10−7 −1.918 · 10−9 −3.294 · 10−9
st. dev. 0.0921 0.0782 0.0179 0.0075 0.0028
skewness 0.896 0.287 -0.034 3.443 · 10−4 −3.8 · 10−7
kurtosis 227.089 277.33 116.679 3.373 2.004
c1 0.515 0.538 0.304 0.164 1.06 · 10
−5
TABLE I: Descriptive statistics of log-returns and the autocorrelation coefficient at the first
lag of absolute log-returns for different ρ, made on 1000 runs of simulation of 106 events.
for the tick-by-tick absolute log-return series for ρ = 0.8, ρ = 1.2 and for ρ = 6. A slow decay
of the ACF in ergodic case, showing long range-memory, is in agreement with the stylized
facts found in financial data. One can see that this decay is much faster if ρ increases. In
Fig. 5, we plot the complementary cumulative distribution of kurtosis values (Fig. 5 (a)) and
of c1 (Fig. 5 (b)) for 1000 simulations and for different values of ρ in order to corroborate
the observation made above: there is a jump in the kurtosis of logarithmic returns as well as
a jump in the first-lag autocorrelation of absolute log-returns as ρ moves from values larger
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FIG. 3: Mean values and error bars of the standard deviation (a), kurtosis (b) of
log-returns and the first-lag autocorrelation of absolute log-returns (c) as functions of the
parameter ρ, estimated from 1000 simulations.
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FIG. 4: Sample autocorrelation functions for the absolute log-returns. (a) ergodic case
(ρ = 0.8); (b) non-ergodic case for 1 ≤ ρ < n (ρ = 1.2) and (c) non-ergodic case for ρ ≥ n
(ρ = 6).
than 1 to values smaller than 1.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, in this paper we have shown that a symmetric continuous double auction
model has three regimes depending on the value of the parameter ρ. If 0 < ρ < 1, we are
in the ergodic regime and prices are free to fluctuate over the full available price range. For
ρ ≥ 1, we have the transition to a non-ergodic regime which stabilizes prices. However, there
is a further transition. If 1 ≤ ρ < n, where n is the size of the allowed range for limit orders,
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions of the
kurtosis of logarithmic returns (a) and the autocorrelation at the first-lag of absolute
log-returns (b) for different values of ρ.
prices can still fluctuate within a limited range. If ρ ≥ n, then prices will eventually fluctuate
between two values. Even if this is a feature of our simplified model, the distinction between
the ergodic and non-ergodic regimes is relevant for real equity markets. Our educated guess,
which will be the subject of further research, is that they live in the non-ergodic regime, but
not too far from the threshold.
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